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exeCuTive SuMMAry
T
his study tests the supposition that different types of restaurants appeal to or attract substantially 
divergent market segments. Instead of targeting specific markets, the analysis suggests that 
restaurant brand managers should take a mass marketing approach. The study examines the 
“Consumer Picks” survey data collected by WD Partners and the National Restaurant Association 
to determine the extent to which a particular restaurant brand shares its customers with other restaurant 
brands. The analysis finds that the extent of sharing is almost completely explained by the restaurants’ 
market share, rather than by market targeting. Five sets of restaurants were tested: (1) hamburger 
quick-service restaurants (QSRs); (2) chicken, Mexican, and pizza QSRs; (3) fast casual concepts; (4) 
full-service casual restaurants; and (5) table-service restaurants. Each restaurant brand shared its 
customers with the other brands in proportion to the other brands’ shares of customers and in inverse 
proportion to its own share of customers. While some restaurant brands shared customers substantially 
more or less than expected given the sizes of their customer bases, these cases did not occur more 
frequently than one would expect from chance. This pattern of data suggests that the different restaurant 
brands do not attract substantially different types of consumers, which in turn suggests that restaurant 
brands should aim most of their marketing efforts at increasing their appeal to all restaurant customers. 
That is, most of restaurant marketers’ time, energy and money should be devoted to mass marketing 
and not targeting subsets of consumers.
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CorneLL hoSpiTALiTy reporT
Imagine that you are the head of marketing at a national, casual dining restaurant chain whose goal is to grow the brands’ customer base from 10 percent of casual dining customers to 25 percent of those customers over the next ten years. Obviously, this goal cannot be achieved through marketing alone; at the very least, it will also require an expansion of the number of 
restaurants your firm operates. Nevertheless, in thinking about marketing’s role in achieving this goal, 
you generate the following possible strategies:
(1) re-designing the brand’s logo, signs, and restaurant faÇades to make the brand more visually 
distinctive and appealing;
(2) increasing the reach of your ads by increasing your ad budget and placing greater emphasis on 
mass media;
(3) targeting those market segments that already constitute your biggest customer base by 
concentrating on messages and media that will disproportionately appeal to and reach those 
segments; and
(4) targeting those market segments that are currently underrepresented in your customer base by 
creating new menu items and marketing communications specifically for them and using media 
outlets that will disproportionately reach those potential customers.
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You would like to pursue all four strategies, but have 
a limited marketing budget, so must prioritize them. How 
would you rank these strategies from most to least effective? 
If you ranked strategies 3 and 4 higher than strategies 1 and 
2, then you responded in a way that most marketing profes-
sors and consultants would support, but in this report I argue 
otherwise. 
Strategies 3 and 4 are targeting strategies, while strategies 
1 and 2 are mass marketing strategies. Conventional market-
ing wisdom suggests that the targeting strategies are more ef-
fective than the mass strategies. For example, Gary Armstrong 
and Philip Kotler write, “... most modern marketers have 
strong doubts about this (mass marketing) strategy. Difficul-
ties arise in developing a product or brand that will satisfy 
all consumers. Moreover, mass marketers often have trouble 
competing with more focused firms that do a better job of 
satisfying the needs of specific segments and niches.”1 Along 
the same line, Brandon O’Dell writes: “One of the biggest 
mistakes restaurants make is trying to appeal to everyone. If 
you think that your target market includes everyone, you are 
setting yourself up to fail. If you want to be successful in any 
business, especially the restaurant business, then you need to 
define who it is that is most likely to buy your products, and 
focus your concept to appeal to that defined market.”2 
Those quotes represent the conventional argument, but 
in the pages that follow, I will present evidence that favoring 
a target marketing strategy over a mass marketing strategy 
is wrong. Target marketing can be an effective tactic that 
produces modest or temporary gains in sales, but it is not an 
effective strategy for substantial, long-lasting increases in your 
customer base. To achieve that goal, you must increase the ap-
peal of your restaurants to all consumers via mass marketing. 
The effectiveness of target marketing rests on the assump-
tion that different types of people look for different things 
when choosing a brand in a particular product category, and 
consequently different types of brands will appeal to different 
types of people. While this assumption seems to be intuitive 
and true, it is not obvious that restaurants can differentiate 
themselves sufficiently to attract widely different types of 
1  Gary Armstrong and Philip Kotler, Marketing: An Introduction, 11/E 
(Boston: Prentice Hall, 2013), p. 175
2  Brandon O’Dell, “Restaurant Marketing: Who Is the Target Market for 
Your Restaurant?,” http://www.restaurantreport.com/departments/biz_tar-
get-market-for-your-restaurant.html, viewed 6/26/12.
consumers. It’s hard to argue that the differences in the 
features that various consumer segments want out of a 
product category, or a brand within that category, are large 
or distinctive enough to justify and support target market-
ing strategies. There does not seem to be sufficient room 
to create substantial differences in the types of people that 
different brands attract. In this report, I examine this ques-
tion of the extent to which different types of brands within 
a product category appeal to different types of people. 
Sharing Customers
One way to answer this question about the appeal of differ-
ent types of brands to different types of people is to exam-
ine the extent to which different brands share customers 
with one another.3 If different types of brands attract dif-
ferent types of people, then brands should share customers 
with other brands of a similar type far more often than they 
share with other dissimilar brands. Empirical evidence that 
two brands share customers to a greater than typical degree 
indicates that they have some similarity that both differ-
entiates them from other brands and attracts some type 
of customer that the other brands are less likely to attract. 
Furthermore, evidence that two brands share customers 
to a smaller than typical degree indicates that one or more 
of the brands has a distinctive characteristic that attracts a 
type of customer that is less attracted to the other brand.
One disadvantage of this approach is that is not very 
sensitive. Two brands sharing product- or marketing-relat-
ed characteristics that differentiate them from other brands 
would display sizably disproportionate customer sharing 
only if those shared characteristics appealed to a large 
subset of product category users substantially more than 
to others. Shared brand characteristics would not produce 
sizably disproportionate customer sharing if they appealed 
strongly to only a small subset of category users, or if the 
characteristics appealed to a large subset of category users 
only slightly more than to others. However, target market-
ing will produce large gains in customers only if the brand 
in question appeals to a large subset of product category 
3 Another way to answer this question is by comparing the customer 
profiles of different types of brands. I took this approach in a previous 
CHR Report and found that different brands within the hotel and cruise 
industries do not attract substantially different types of customers. See: 
Michael Lynn, “Brand Segmentation in the Hotel and Cruise Industries: 
Fact or Fiction?,” Cornell Hospitality Report, Vol. 7, No. 4 (February 
2007), Cornell Center for Hospitality Research.
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words, duplication of purchase analyses in varied product 
categories indicates that market share is the main deter-
minant of the extent to which two brands share customers. 
Deviations from expectations for customer sharing based 
on market share tend to be small, meaning that there is little 
similarity-based customer sharing among brands.
Although duplication of purchase analyses have been 
conducted for many different product categories (including 
breakfast cereal, coffee, ice cream, milk, television programs, 
wine grape varietals, and retail stores), they have not to my 
knowledge been conducted for U.S. restaurants. The restau-
rant market may be an exception to the general finding that 
two or more brands within a category rarely share customers 
substantially more or less than expected given their relative 
market shares, because there are such clear types of restau-
rants (and restaurant brands) in terms of atmosphere, levels 
of service, and types of cuisine. Intuitively, those different 
restaurant types would appeal to different types of people. 
To test whether this intuition is accurate, I use the “Con-
sumer Picks” survey data collected by WD Partners and the 
National Restaurant Association in the analyses that follow. 
Data and Findings 
WD Partners and the National Restaurant Association 
conducted an online survey of over eight thousand consum-
ers in the United States about their attitudes and behaviors 
when it comes to restaurant dining. Among other things, 
respondents were given lists of over 150 restaurant brands 
and asked to indicate “how many times you bought food or 
beverage (eat-in, take-out, or drive thru) from each restau-
rant in the last six months.” Responses to these questions 
were re-coded (as a dummy variable of 1 or 0) to reflect the 
presence or absence of patronage of each restaurant within 
the prior six months. 
Given the vast number of restaurant brands, one cannot 
include all of them in cross-purchase comparisons. To keep 
the number of comparisons to a level that could be mean-
ingfully processed, I selected various mixtures of similar and 
different brands and constructed five different duplication 
of purchase tables (see Exhibits 1 thru 5). In these tables, the 
restaurant brands are listed in order from largest to smallest 
share of customers among the survey respondents. Entries in 
the table reflect the percentage of customers from each res-
taurant in the vertical list of restaurants that also patronized 
the restaurant in the horizontal list of restaurants during the 
six months prior to the survey. 
Brand B will have 20 light users (50 x .4 = 20) and 32 heavy users ((50 x 
.4) + (30 x .4) = 32). In this case, approximately 42 percent of large Brand 
A’s customers (30/72 = 41.7) and 39 percent of small Brand B’s custom-
ers (20/52 = 38.5) are light users even though light and heavy users have 
equal preferences for Brand A over Brand B. 
users substantially more than to others. Thus, the coarse 
view of the marketplace provided by duplication of purchase 
data is an advantage as an aid to strategic thinking because it 
helps to focus attention on the big picture and puts smaller 
effects in perspective. 
Another disadvantage of this approach is that the brand 
characteristics or customer types that are driving the anom-
aly are not immediately made clear from unusually high or 
unusually low customer sharing. However, that disadvan-
tage is also this technique’s key advantage because it means 
that this approach allows you to see if there are any brand 
characteristics that disproportionately appeal to any type of 
customer; it is not necessary to specify any brand similarities 
or dissimilarities ahead of time. If unusual customer sharing 
is found, then questions about what brand characteristics 
and customer types are driving the anomalous customer 
sharing can be explored with more research. 
Analyses of customer sharing (or duplication of pur-
chase) in numerous product categories have found that dif-
ferent types of brands within a category do not attract sub-
stantially different types of customers; similar brands share 
customers with one another only slightly (if at all) more than 
they do with dissimilar brands.4 Instead, customer sharing 
follows two principles, one known as the “Duplication of 
Purchase Law” and the other, the “Law of Natural Monopoly.” 
The Duplication of Purchase Law states that “A brand’s cus-
tomer base overlaps with the customer base of other brands, 
in line with their market share (i.e., a brand shares the most 
customers with large brands and the least customers with 
small brands).”5 The Natural Monopoly Law states that 
“Brands with more market share attract a greater proportion 
of light category buyers.”6 Since light category buyers patron-
ize fewer brands than do heavy category buyers, this latter 
principle means that large brands tend to share fewer of their 
customers with other brands than do small brands.7 In other 
4 Andrew S.C. Ehrenberg, “Towards an Integrated Theory of Consumer 
Behavior,” International Journal of Market Research, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1996), 
pp. 395-427; Desmond Lam, “Applicability of the Duplication of Purchase 
Law to Gaming,” UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 
(2006), pp. 55-62; Byron Sharp and Anne Sharp, “Loyalty Programs and 
Their Impact on Repeat-purchase Loyalty Patterns,” International Journal 
of Research in Marketing, Vol. 14 (1997), pp. 473-486.
5 Byron Sharp, How Brands Grow (London: Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 217.
6 Ibid.
7 This empirical generalization is a statistical artifact rather than a reflec-
tion of differences in the preferences of light and heavy users. To under-
stand this artifact, consider the following hypothetical example involving 
50 light and 50 heavy users of a product category for which there are two 
competing brands. If light users purchase once a week, while heavy users 
purchase twice a week and both groups choose Brand A 60 percent of the 
time and Brand B 40 percent of the time, then Brand A will have 30 light 
buyers (50 x .6 = 30) and 42 heavy users ((50 x .6 ) + (20 x .6) = 42) while 
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Hamburger QSR Brands
For example, Exhibit 1, which shows hamburger quick-ser-
vice brands, indicates that 76.6 percent of the respondents 
to this survey who patronized McDonald’s in the prior six 
months also patronized Subway over that same period of 
time.
The key to this analysis is to control for the Duplica-
tion of Purchase Law and the Natural Monopoly Law, to 
highlight situations where the shared percentages were not 
as expected. To do this, I conducted a regression of the cell 
percentages on the relevant column-company’s share of all 
respondents and on the relevant row-company’s share of all 
respondents. The resulting residuals allowed me to identify 
those cases where one restaurant shared another’s customers 
significantly more or less than expected given each restau-
rant’s shares of respondents. Cell percentages that were 10 
or more percentage points from expected values are in bold, 
while cell percentages that were 1.96 standard deviations (p 
< .05) and 2.57 standard deviations (p < .01) from expected 
values are identified with colored backgrounds in the tables. 
As you can see, the data suggest that only occasionally does 
a restaurant brand share another’s customers significantly 
more or less than expected given their relative market shares. 
Many of those rare cases can still be attributed to chance due 
to the large number of cases tested. 
Looking again at the hamburger QSR brands in Exhibit 
1, we see several notable patterns in the data. First, the 
column averages decline as you move from left to right. This 
means that each restaurant brand shares more of its custom-
ers with other large restaurant brands like McDonald’s and 
Subway than with other small restaurant brands like Jack in 
the Box and Hardee’s. This pattern replicates the Duplication 
of Purchase Law, with regard to QSR restaurants in the U.S., 
and is statistically reliable (B 
row Co share
 = 1.24, t (107) = 64.36, 
p < .001). 
Second, the row averages generally increase as you 
move from top to bottom in Exhibit 1. In other words, 
large restaurant brands like McDonald’s and Subway share 
a smaller percentage of their own customers with other 
brands (47.5 for McDonald’s and 48.8 percent for Subway on 
average) than do smaller restaurant brands like Jack in the 
Box (57.0 percent on average) and Hardee’s (58.2 percent on 
average). This pattern reflects the fact that larger U.S. QSR 
brands have proportionately more light category buyers than 
do smaller brands, in keeping with the Natural Monopoly 
Law. This effect was also statistically reliable (B column Co share = 
-.08, t (107) = -4.23, p < .001).
Finally and most important, the percentages within 
each column are fairly similar; they rarely deviate by a sta-
tistically significant amount from the expected value given 
the sizes of the restaurant brands involved. Our regression 
analysis indicated that the measures of brand size accounted 
for 97.5 percent of the variance in customer sharing (F (2, 
109) = 2128.55, p < .001), so deviations from expected values 
Exhibit 1
Duplication of patronage over six months for hamburger and other quick-service restaurants in the united 
States 
 percentage of customers who also patronized
    Burger Taco  Dairy  Five Jack in 
Customers of McDonald’s  Subway Wendy’s King Bell KFC Queen Sonic Guys the Box  hardee’s Average
McDonald’s  76.6 67.5 68.6 65.2 58.8 42.4 37.7 20.7 18.9 18.4 47.5
Subway 85.8  67.5 67.4 66.0 59.3 44.4 38.2 21.2 19.8 18.1 48.8
Wendy’s 89.3 79.8  73.4 70.7 63.1 46.3 42.1 24.1 19.1 21.1 52.9
Burger King 90.7 79.6 73.3  70.2 64.2 46.1 39.7 22.1 20.7 21.3 52.8
Taco Bell 89.8 81.1 73.5 73.1  65.3 46.3 43.0 22.7 22.7 20.8 53.8
KFC 89.9 81.0 72.9 74.3 72.6  48.2 41.4 21.6 21.2 22.4 54.5
Dairy Queen 88.7 83.0 73.1 72.9 70.4 65.9  45.6 24.4 21.8 24.4 57.0
Sonic 90.1 81.6 76.0 71.7 74.7 64.6 52.1  25.8 25.4 26.7 58.9
Five Guys 86.0 78.4 75.4 69.3 68.5 58.7 48.4 44.8  17.5 22.5 57.0
Jack in the Box 88.3 82.5 67.3 73.1 75.9 64.8 48.6 49.6 19.7  11.7 58.2
hardee’s  92.0 80.9 79.9 80.6 66.0 73.4 58.5 56.1 27.2 12.5  62.7
Average 89.1 80.5 72.6 72.4 70.0 63.8 48.1 43.8 23.0 20.0 20.7 
Share of All 
Respondents 71% 63% 54% 54% 52% 47% 34% 30% 17% 15% 14% 
 Notes: Values shown in bold deviate from the expected value by 10 or more percentage points. Values on a yellow background deviate from the expected value with p < .05, 
while values on a red background deviate from the expected value with p <.01. 
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represent a small portion of the total variance in the data. In 
fact, there were only seven cases where the observed level 
of customer sharing was over 1.96 standard deviations from 
expectations, and this is not significantly different from the 
5.5 such cases that would be expected by chance, since there 
were 110 total cases.8
Only four cases in Exhibit 1 seem both practically 
and statistically significant, and all involve Hardee’s. Dairy 
Queen and Sonic both get more than the expected share of 
Hardee’s customers, while both Hardee’s and Jack in the Box 
get less than the expected share of one another’s custom-
ers. It is difficult to explain the Dairy Queen–Hardee’s and 
Sonic–Hardee’s cases because the unusual customer sharing 
between them is not bi-directional. Further complicating the 
picture, Dairy Queen and Sonic, though both getting unusu-
ally high levels of Hardee’s customers, do not attract unusual 
levels of one another’s customers. Given these asymetries, 
perhaps these two cases are just chance deviations.
The reciprocal nature of the customer sharing (or 
unusual lack thereof) between Hardee’s and Jack in the Box 
8 The probability of getting seven such extreme cases by chance alone is 
.331 as determined using the binomial distribution with 110 cases. The 
residuals from this and the other regression analyses reported later were 
close to normally distributed (though there was a repeated tendency to 
have too many residuals near the mean). A one-sample Kologorov-Smirov 
Test produced  the following p-values: Exhibit 1, .096; Exhibit 2, .998; Ex-
hibit 3, .196; Exhibit 4, .125; and  Exhibit 5, .028. Thus, only the residuals 
from Exhibit 5 (in the appendix) had a significantly non-normal distribu-
tion (with too many cases near the mean and too few cases moderately 
above the mean), but even their distribution was roughly normal.
provides more compelling evidence that these restaurants 
differ from one another in some way or ways that causes 
them to attract different types of customers. What those 
critical restaurant differences are and precisely how the 
restaurants’ customer profiles differ would be interesting 
topics for future research. For current purposes, however, it 
is more important to note that, apart from this one pair of 
restaurants, there is little evidence of different types of QSR 
brands attracting different types of people. 
Regional Hamburger QSRs
Exhibit 1 presents national data and compares restaurant 
chains that differ widely in regional distribution. Readers 
may wonder how the comparison of national brands with 
more regional brands affected the results and what the re-
sults might look like within a smaller geographic area where 
some regional brands may have a more equal footing with 
truly national brands. To address this question, I repeated 
the analyses in Exhibit 1 for California residents only, with 
the results presented in Exhibit 2. (Note: Five Guys Burgers 
and Fries and Hardee’s were left out of this analyses as both 
restaurant brands had fewer than 100 customers in the Cali-
fornia sample, making any statistics for those brands highly 
unreliable.) As you can see, the relative sizes of several of the 
brands’ customer shares differed in California as compared 
to the nation as whole, and this affected the extent to which 
brands shared customers. For example, Jack in the Box has a 
much larger share of customers in California than in the U.S. 
as a whole. As a result, every brand shared more of its cus-
Exhibit 2
Duplication of patronage over six months for hamburger and other quick service restaurants in California
percentage of customers who also patronized
   Taco Jack in Burger   Dairy   
Customers of McDonald’s  Subway Bell the Box King KFC Wendy’s Queen Sonic  Average
McDonald’s  81.9 71.4 70.1 66.1 61.9 56.4 29.7 24.4 57.7
Subway 82.8  70.4 67.0 62.1 58.5 55.3 30.6 24.9 56.5
Taco Bell  85.6 83.6  73.7 69.4 64.4 61.4 31.3 28.5 62.2
Jack in the Box  86.7 82.0 76.0  69.8 62.5 61.7 33.1 28.1 62.5
Burger King 90.5 84.1 79.3 77.2  64.8 65.7 34.3 30.0 65.7
KFC 88.6 82.8 76.8 72.3 67.8  65.1 36.4 29.8 65.0
Wendy’s 88.4 85.8 80.2 78.2 75.2 71.3  38.9 36.0 69.3
Dairy Queen 86.0 87.8 75.6 77.4 72.6 73.8 72.0  42.7 73.5
Sonic 84.7 85.4 82.5 78.8 75.9 72.3 79.6 51.1  76.3
Average 86.7 84.2 76.5 74.3 69.9 66.2 64.7 35.7 30.6 
Share of All  
Respondents 67% 67% 56% 54% 49% 47% 43% 23% 19% 
 Notes: Values shown in bold deviate from the expected value by 10 or more percentage points. Values on a yellow background deviate from the expected value 
with p < .05, while values on a red background deviate from the expected value with p <.01.
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tomers with Jack in the Box in California than nationwide. 
Also, Jack in the Box shared its own customers with the 
other brands less in California (relative to the other brand’s 
sharing of their customers) than in the United States as a 
whole.9 However, the data still show that each of these res-
taurant brands shared its customers with the other brands 
in proportion to the other brands’ shares of customer (B 
row-share
 = 1.12, t (69) = 38.69, p < .001) and in inverse pro-
portion to its own share of customers ((B 
column-share
 = -.25, t 
(69) = -8.51, p < .001). Together, these effects accounted for 
96.1 percent of the variability in customer sharing (F (2, 69) 
= 839.13, p < .001) and deviations from these two effects 
remained small. Only three cases were over 1.96 deviations 
from expectations, but 3.6 such cases would be expected by 
chance alone given the number of cases tested. Thus, this 
analysis also provides little evidence that different brands 
attract different types of customers.
Other Restaurant Concepts
The patterns of data seen in Exhibits 1 and 2 are basically 
repeated in the analyses shown in Exhibits 3 thru 5 (as de-
tailed in Appendix A). Exhibit 3 contains data on duplica-
tion of patronage for several chicken, Mexican, and pizza 
QSR brands, Exhibit 4 contains a similar analysis for several 
casual, full-service restaurant brands, and Exhibit 5 shows 
the data for various table-service restaurant brands across a 
wide range of price points. In all these analyses, the restau-
rant brands shared their customers with the other brands 
in proportion to the other brands’ shares of customer (à la 
the Duplication of Purchase Law) and in inverse proportion 
to its own share of customers (in keeping with the Natural 
Monopoly Law). Together, these effects accounted for 90-
plus percent of the variability in customer sharing. More 
important, the deviations from these two laws remained 
small and generally within levels not different from chance. 
Thus, the finding that different restaurant brands do not 
attract substantially different types of customers is robust 
across a wide range of differences between the brands being 
compared. 
Conclusions and Marketing Implications
The data presented above indicate that there are substantial 
differences in the extent to which restaurant brands share 
their customers with other restaurant brands. For example, 
only 16 percent of Applebees’ customers also patronized 
P.F. Chang’s, while 91 percent of Burger King’s customers 
also patronized McDonald’s. However, these differences are 
almost completely explained by market share; each restau-
rant brand shared its customers with the other brands in 
9  In California, Jack in the Box shared fewer of its customers with others 
than did Burger King, KFC, Wendy’s, Dairy Queen, and Sonic, whereas 
the U..S. as a whole, Jack in the Box shared more of its customers with 
others than did Burger King, KFC, Wendy’s, Dairy Queen, and Sonic.
proportion to the other brands’ shares of customer and in 
inverse proportion to its own share of customers. There were 
few cases where restaurant brands shared customers substan-
tially and reliably more or less than expected, given the sizes 
of their customer bases. This pattern of data means that the 
various restaurant brands being compared did not attract 
substantially different types of customers.
One possible limitation to this study is the one I men-
tioned at the outset. I did not compare customer sharing 
across all possible pairs of restaurants. Had I compared all 
combinations of different restaurants, one could argue, I 
might have found evidence of unusually high or low custom-
er sharing not evident in the sample of restaurants examined. 
For example, it must surely be the case that a vegetarian 
restaurant attracts a different type of customer than a steak-
house. 
Looking again at the restaurant brands examined in this 
study, they differed substantially in food type, service style, 
service quality, atmosphere, and price point. Consequently, 
the analysis effectively tested most of the attributes that 
national restaurant brands might use to differentiate them-
selves and appeal to specific types of consumers. Although 
there was some evidence of unusual levels of customer 
sharing between a few of these brands, it was clear that these 
restaurant brands were mostly drawing from the same pool 
of customers in line with their respective market shares. Thus, 
generalizing beyond the specific restaurant brands studied to 
conclude that different types of restaurants do not appeal to 
substantially different types of consumers seems justified. 
An extreme case. Beyond that, I am not sure that even 
vegetarian and steak restaurants necessarily differ that much 
in their customer bases (i.e., in terms of who eats there or 
not). Certainly, vegetarians are different from meat lovers in 
the sense that the vegetarians eat at vegetarian restaurants 
more frequently than do steak lovers, and the reverse is true 
at steakhouses. That said, many vegetarians almost certainly 
join non-vegetarians to dine at steakhouses, which after 
all offer salads or vegetable plates for those who do not eat 
meat. Similarly, many steak lovers occasionally patronize 
vegetarian restaurants, again to join a party that has selected 
a particular restaurant. Just as one example, I was born and 
raised a Texan, which makes eating meat part of my birth-
right, and I eat meat at almost every meal. Meat lover that 
I am, though, I have joined friends to eat at Moosewood, 
Ithaca’s famous vegetarian restaurant. Ultimately, there must 
be some differences between the customers of vegetarian and 
steak restaurants, but those differences may not be as large as 
some analysts assume. 
To continue with this example, even if vegetarian and 
steak restaurants do attract substantially different customer 
bases, the difference between those types of restaurants is 
about as extreme as you can get. Other differences between 
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restaurants and restaurant concepts are unlikely to be as 
marked and impactful. The analysis in Exhibit 5 demon-
strates this point. If anything, the example of vegetarian 
restaurants versus steakhouses might be the exception that 
proves the rule.
For target marketing to be successful, different types of 
people must look for different things when choosing a brand 
from within a product category. Put another way, different 
types of brands must appeal to substantially different types 
of people. Thus, this study’s findings that different restau-
rant brands do not attract substantially different types of 
customers means that target marketing is not likely to result 
in a particular restaurant brand “owning” or even “dominat-
ing” a segment; at best target marketing is likely to produce 
only modest or temporary advantages over the competition 
with the targeted segment or segments.10 Of course, even 
modest or temporary increases in a restaurant brand’s share 
of a particular market segment can have a worthwhile effect 
on the bottom line, especially when aggregated across many 
stores throughout the entire nation. Thus, targeting tailored 
products and messages to specific subsets of customers is a 
viable and potentially profitable marketing tactic. It is just 
not a good strategic way of attaining substantial, long-lasting 
increases to your customer base. That is why the targeting 
strategies proposed in options 3 and 4 of the hypothetical 
scenario that opened this report should not be ranked highly 
given the goals in that scenario.
The chief implication of this study is that these res-
taurant brands owe their size to their overall appeal to all 
restaurant customers and not to a disproportionate appeal 
to any specific, differentiated segment (otherwise greater 
10  One can imagine a targeting effort that has a large effect. However, 
such successful attempts at targeting some particular segment tend to be 
quickly copied by competitors so that the targeted segment of custom-
ers is once again shared by all in proportion to their shares of the overall 
market. For example, Wendy’s introduced salads to the fast food burger 
industry and this might have substantially increased its share of the fe-
male market if its main competitor, McDonald’s, had not copied this move 
by adding salads to its menu too. Likewise, most QSR brands followed 
McDonald’s when they developed the breakfast day part.
deviations from expected customer sharing would have been 
observed). This suggests that if your goal is substantial and 
long-lasting gains in your customer base, you need to con-
centrate your marketing efforts on appealing to all restaurant 
customers, not just a theoretical target.
Successful Marketing Strategies
While this study does not examine how to increase the ap-
peal of your restaurants to all customers, some marketing 
experts suggest that the key strategies are to improve: (1) 
the quality of your food, atmosphere, and service, and (2) 
the physical accessibility (that is, distribution) and mental 
accessibility (that is, familiarity) of your restaurant.11 These 
are restaurant attributes that drive the choices of all con-
sumers and that I believe help explain the relatively stable 
differences in restaurant brands’ market shares. Thus, these 
are the attributes to focus on improving in order to achieve 
substantial and long-lasting growth. 
Of the attributes that drive consumers’ brand choices, 
mental accessibility is most clearly and exclusively in the 
domain of marketing. Restaurant marketers can increase 
the mental accessibility of their brands by having distinctive 
(easily recognizable) names, spokespersons, signs, build-
ing shapes or facades, and interior layouts and decorations. 
Advertising these distinctive brand assets to all consumers 
is clearly another way to improve familiarity.12 This is why 
options 1 and 2 in the hypothetical scenario that opened 
this report should be ranked highly given the goals in that 
scenario. 
In summary, contrary to what many people might 
believe, duplication of purchase data indicates that different 
restaurant brands do not attract substantially different types 
of customers. This means that target marketing is unlikely to 
produce a large and long-lasting increase in your customer 
base. To achieve this goal, you need to increase your appeal 
to all restaurant customers, not just a select few. n
11 Byron Sharp, How Brands Grow (London: Oxford University Press, 
2010).
12 Ibid.
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Appendix A
As mentioned in the accompanying text, Exhibit 3 contains data on 
duplication of patronage (over a six month period) for several chicken, 
Mexican, and pizza quick-service restaurant brands. Again, the data 
show that each of these restaurant brands shared its customers with the 
other brands in proportion to the other brands’ shares of customers  
(B row-share = 1.30, t (107) = 42.08, p < .001, reflecting the Duplication of 
Purchase Law) and in inverse proportion to its own share of customers  
(B column-share = -.20, t (107) = -6.54, p < .001, in concert with the Natural 
Monopoly Law). Together, these effects accounted for 94.6 percent of 
Exhibit 3
Duplication of patronage over six months for various quick service chicken, Mexican and pizza restaurants
the variability in customer sharing (F (2, 107) = 943.71, p < .001). More 
important, the deviations from these two laws remained small. Only 
eight cases were over 1.96 deviations from expectations. This number is 
not significantly different from the 5.5 such cases that would be 
expected by chance alone given the number of cases tested. The most 
notable positive deviation—namely, Chick-fil-A getting more of CiCi’s 
customers than expected—does not reflect any obvious commonality 
between the restaurants. Thus, this analysis joins the others in providing 
little evidence that different brands attract different types of customers.
percentage of customers who also patronized
 Taco  pizza  papa Chick Little   panda Cici’s 
Customers of Bell  KFC hut Domino’s John’s fil-A Caesar’s popeye’s Chipotle  express pizza Average
Taco Bell  65.3 60.4 45.1 38.6 36.0 35.7 24.8 22.0 19.5 18.4 36.6
KFC 72.6  62.8 46.2 39.1 34.5 34.8 26.7 19.4 18.8 18.1 37.3
pizza hut 72.4 67.7  49.8 41.1 36.5 35.7 26.4 21.3 20.3 18.8 39.0
Domino’s 74.6 68.7 68.7  49.1 41.2 39.8 29.7 27.1 22.9 20.5 44.2
papa John’s 74.9 68.3 66.6 57.6  45.5 42.3 32.0 27.7 22.7 23.7 46.1
Chick-fil-A 72.2 62.3 61.0 50.0 46.9  36.9 31.3 28.2 18.5 27.7 43.5
Little Caesar’s 80.5 70.5 67.1 54.3 49.1 41.5  30.5 25.3 26.8 25.7 47.1
popeye’s 75.5 73.1 67.1 54.6 50.1 47.4 41.1  29.5 25.6 26.3 49.0
Chipotle 71.4 56.4 57.7 53.2 46.2 45.6 36.3 31.4  34.6 20.0 45.3
panda express 75.9 65.8 65.9 54.0 45.5 36.0 46.3 32.7 41.6  16.5 48.0
CiCi’s 79.2 70.0 67.4 53.5 52.6 59.4 49.1 37.2 26.6 18.2  51.3
Average 74.9 66.8 64.5 51.8 45.8 42.4 39.8 30.3 26.9 22.8 21.6 
Share of all Respondents 52% 47% 43% 31% 27% 26% 23% 17% 16% 13% 12% 
 Notes: Values shown in bold deviate from the expected value by 10 or more percentage points. Values on a yellow background deviate from the expected value with 
p < .05, while values on a red background deviate from the expected value with p <.01
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Exhibit 4
Duplication of patronage over six months for various casual, full-service restaurants
percentage of customers who also patronized
 olive  red   TGi ruby red Cheesecake Long p.F. 
Customers of Garden Applebee’s Lobster outback Chili’s Friday Tuesday robin Factory  horn Chang’s Average
olive Garden  59.2 50.0 42.2 39.1 38.8 29.0 25.4 24.8 19.9 17.6 34.6
Applebee’s 64.7  47.2 42.5 39.0 39.7 31.2 26.3 23.0 20.5 16.3 35.0
red Lobster 69.2 59.8  46.5 38.9 40.0 32.9 26.3 24.5 22.2 18.7 37.9
outback 68.5 63.2 54.7  43.8 43.9 33.5 27.7 28.9 26.7 21.5 41.2
Chili’s 67.9 62.0 48.9 46.8  44.5 31.7 29.9 28.1 22.0 19.8 40.2
TGi Friday 70.2 65.4 52.2 48.7 46.2  39.9 28.5 32.7 23.7 21.6 42.9
ruby Tuesday 69.7 68.5 57.2 49.4 43.7 53.1  28.6 28.7 31.5 19.7 45.0
red robin 68.1 64.3 50.9 45.7 46.1 42.4 31.9  32.6 20.7 24.0 42.7
Cheesecake Factory 71.8 60.7 51.3 51.4 46.7 52.4 34.5 35.2  23.8 35.4 46.3
Long horn 72.1 67.8 58.0 59.5 45.9 47.6 47.5 28.0 29.8  21.2 47.7
p.F. Chang’s 72.0 61.0 55.3 54.2 46.7 49.1 33.6 36.8 50.2 24.0  48.3
Average 69.4 63.2 52.6 48.7 43.6 45.2 34.6 29.3 30.3 23.5 21.6 
Share of All  
Respondents 42% 39% 31% 26% 24% 23% 18% 16% 15% 12% 10% 
 
 Notes: Values shown in bold deviate from the expected value by 10 or more percentage points. Values on a yellow background deviate from the expected value with p < .05, 
while values on a red background deviate from the expected value with p <.01
Exhibit 4 shows a similar analysis for casual, full-service restaurant 
brands. Again, the data show that each of these restaurant brands 
shared its customers with the other brands in proportion to the other 
brands’ shares of customers (B row-share = 1.45, t (107) = 40.28, p < .001, 
again fitting the Duplication of Purchase Law) and in inverse proportion 
to its own share of customers (B column-share = -.29, t (107) = -8.09, 
p < .001, in keeping with the Natural Monopoly Law). Together, these 
effects accounted for 94.3 percent of the variability in customer sharing 
(F (2, 107) = 885.49, p < .001). As was the case for the other segments, 
the deviations from these two laws remained small. For the casual 
restaurants, only seven cases were over 1.96 deviations from 
expectations, a number that is not significantly different from the 5.5 
such cases that would be expected by chance alone given the number of 
cases tested. 
Only three cases in Exhibit 4 appear both practically and statistically 
significant. First, Outback gets a larger than expected share of Long 
Horn’s customers. This might reflect a tendency for steakhouses to 
appeal to a distinctive customer type, but if so, it does not lead Long 
Horn to get a significantly larger than expected share of Outback’s 
customers. Second, the Cheesecake Factory and P.F. Chang’s both get 
more of each other’s customers than expected. This unusually high level 
of customer sharing may be attributable to the fact both restaurants are 
fairly expensive compared to the others in this particular test. It makes 
sense that expensive restaurants would attract different (wealthier) 
customers than less expensive restaurants. 
In fact, this possibility seemed so likely that I looked for other price-
based deviations from expected levels of customer sharing, with the 
results shown in Exhibit 5. However, it is worth noting that the 
deviations described above are still modest in size given the total 
variability in customer sharing and that each member of the mentioned 
restaurant pairs above still shares customers with the other restaurants in 
the table, as expected given their market shares. Though there is some 
evidence that steakhouses and expensive restaurants may attract certain 
types of customers at higher rates than do other types of restaurants, it 
is clear that all of these restaurants are mostly drawing from the same 
pool of customers in line with their market shares.
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Steak n Shake’s customers. However, this is not a bi-directional effect 
and may be due to chance; with 110 cases, at least one case would be 
expected to differ from expectations at the .01 level by chance alone. 
The other two cases are the Cheesecake Factory and P.F. Chang’s, which I 
also included in the analysis shown in Exhibit 4. Once again, the most 
likely explanation for the unusually high level of customer sharing 
between these two restaurants is that both attract more wealthy 
customers than do the less expensive restaurants. Still, there is no other 
evidence that price differences among the restaurants lead to unusually 
large or small levels of customer sharing. Thus, taken as a whole, these 
data suggest that restaurants with widely different prices do not attract 
substantially different types of customers. 
Finally, Exhibit 5 extends the analysis to table-service restaurant brands 
across a wide range of price points. Again, the data show that each of 
these restaurant brands shared its customers with the other brands in 
proportion to the other brands’ shares of customers (B row-share = 1.39, t 
(107) = 32.01, p < .001, fitting the Duplication of Purchase Law) and in 
inverse proportion to its own share of customers ((B column-share = -.27, t 
(107) = -6.30, p < .001, reflecting the Natural Monopoly Law). Together, 
these effects accounted for 91.2 percent of the variability in customer 
sharing (F (2, 107) = 557.84, p < .001). In this section of the analysis, 
only four cases were over 1.96 deviations from expectations, not 
appreciably different from the 5.5 such cases one would expect by 
chance alone. 
Only three cases in Exhibit 5 appear to be both practically and statistically 
significant. First, Cracker Barrel gets more than the expected share of 
Exhibit 5
Duplication of patronage over six months for various table service restaurants across a wide range of prices
percentage of customers who also patronized
   red    Cracker Texas Cheesecake Steak n Buffalo p.F. 
Customers of Applebee’s ihop Lobster Denny’s Chili’s Barrel roadhouse Factory Shake Wild Wings Chang’s Average 
price* $$$ $ $$$$ $$ $$$ $$ $$$ $$$$ $ $$ $$$$
Applebee’s ($$$)  48.2 47.2 39.3 39.0 30.5 24.8 23.0 21.7 23.2 16.3 31.3
ihop ($) 58.0  49.3 47.0 39.7 30.1 25.1 26.6 22.8 23.0 18.4 34.0
red Lobster ($$$$) 59.8 51.8  41.8 38.9 31.8 26.3 24.5 24.2 21.5 18.7 33.9
Denny’s ($$) 59.5 59.0 50.0  39.3 28.0 23.8 26.6 23.6 22.4 17.6 35.0
Chili’s ($$$) 62.0 52.4 48.9 41.3  32.6 29.4 28.1 23.9 27.3 19.8 36.6
Cracker Barrel ($$) 60.7 49.7 50.0 36.8 40.8  34.1 23.8 35.2 25.1 16.6 37.3
Texas roadhouse ($$$) 62.0 52.0 52.0 39.3 46.2 42.8  26.3 30.2 32.5 19.9 40.3
Cheesecake Factory ($$$$) 60.7 58.5 51.3 46.5 46.7 31.6 27.8  23.4 28.9 35.4 41.1
Steak n Shake ($) 61.1 53.2 53.7 43.9 42.2 49.8 34.0 24.9  30.5 17.2 41.1
Buffalo Wild Wings ($$) 65.7 54.0 48.2 41.9 48.7 35.7 36.9 31.0 30.7  24.4 41.7
p.F. Chang’s ($$$$) 61.0 57.3 55.3 43.7 46.7 31.3 29.8 50.2 22.9 32.3  43.1
Average 61.1 53.6 50.6 42.2 42.8 34.4 29.2 28.5 25.9 26.7 20.4 
Share of All Respondents 39% 32% 31% 26% 24% 19% 16% 15% 14% 14% 10%  
  Notes:  *Pricing data is from Consumer Reports, July 2009, pp. 22-23. Values shown in bold deviate from the expected value by 10 or more percentage points. Values on a yellow 
background deviate from the expected value with p < .05, while values on a red background deviate from the expected value with p <.01
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